AAD Systems Research · Executable companion · Static HTML

Formal-State-Augmented Language Models

This browser-only, scripted demonstration implements the quota-and-permission reference monitor. You supply candidate JSON proposals; a separate JavaScript function checks and commits them. No language model is contacted and no Python server is required.

1 · Initialize example state

Invariant 0 ≤ quota ≤ 3

Guard: a reader can only propose 0. A writer may propose −1, 0, or +1, but only a valid successor is committed.

2 · Submit a proposal

The exact schema is {"delta":-1}, {"delta":0}, or {"delta":1}. Invalid JSON or unsupported types are rejected.
Waiting for a proposal.

3 · State and lossy rendering

True quota
2
Rendered quota
2
Invariant
YES

Current role: writer. The illustrative model-visible rendering r(q,p)=min(q,2) omits the role and merges quota values 2 and 3. The monitor reads the full state, not the rendering.

Audit version: 0

4 · Rendering counterexamples

Load either of two states and submit the same {"delta":1} proposal to observe different admissibility despite identical rendered quota.

Both render to 2; the first is accepted and the second rejected. Similarly, (1, reader) and (1, writer) both render to 1, but have different permissions.

Unguarded baseline, last proposal
No valid action submitted yet.

5 · Ordered audit trail

Every submitted proposal, including malformed JSON, is recorded. Rejections preserve the committed state.
#BeforeActionDecisionReasonAfter

No proposals yet.

6 · Run browser-only semantics tests

Run exhaustive checks of the eight valid initial states with three actions, all 1,944 length-five proposal traces, strict parser edge cases, rendering collisions, audit ordering, and stale-version rejection. The suite tests this browser implementation; cross-language differential testing is supplied separately in the verification report.

Tests not run in this browser session.

Scope and limitations: This HTML file is a faithful educational implementation of the paper's finite quota monitor, not a connected-model experiment, a tamper-resistant authority boundary, or a proof of implementation correctness. Browser users can inspect and modify local code/state through developer tools. The paper's non-bypassability assumption would require a separately enforced execution boundary in a deployed system. No network calls, credentials, or additional hosting are involved.