Formal-State-Augmented Language Models
A local demonstration of the trusted executor boundary. A candidate action is treated as a proposal, not an authorized state change. No language model is called and no network connection is required.
1. Initialize authoritative state
0 ≤ quota ≤ 3Reader: only no-op. Writer: −1, 0, +1 subject to invariant. The underlying update can produce out-of-range states; the monitor prevents their commitment.
2. Propose an action
3. Authoritative vs. model-visible
The deliberately lossy rendering r(q,p)=min(q,2) hides the permission and collapses quota values 2 and 3. The monitor never uses this rendering to authorize an update.
4. What does the baseline do?
An unguarded executor computes U((q,p),a)=(q+a,p) without checking permission or quota. For the last candidate submitted:
Baseline output is a counterfactual single-step comparison and is never committed in this demonstration.
Audit trail
| # | Before | Proposal | Decision | Reason | After |
|---|
No proposals yet.
Scope: toy integer-quota semantics and a local JavaScript visualization. For reproducible batch results and automated tests, run the accompanying Python reference implementation. Neither implementation establishes a security boundary against a malicious host process.